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ARGUMENTS
I.

THERE IS NO BASIS FOR MODIFYING THE LEASE TERM OR
DELAYING VOEST-ALPINE'S OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE
LIABILITY INSURANCE.
Voest-Alpine admits that no provision of the Lease expressly provided

for modification of the Lease term. (Pg.

Voest-Alpine admits tha <

provision of the Lease expressly provid-

* -1 .a> ing its obligati i

cr

the Lease, except the payment of rent. {Id.) As a result, Voest-Alpine admits
that no provision of the Lease expressly provided for delaying its obligation to
provide liability insurance. (Pg. 17) This should have ended the inquiry since
Voest-Alpine admits that the foregoing Lease provisions are "clear." (Pg. 17)
However, Voest-Alpine invites the Court to read beyond the express
language of the agreement because it "produces an itici (tiitablr lesui!

n Pg.

19) Voest-Alpine argues that "[t]here is no justifiable basis for finding that
Voest-Alpine was obligated to procure a bodily injury and property damage
liability insurance policy covering Mountain States and Mountain States'
building where Mountain States failed to deliver possession of the building."
(id.)
The first problem is that no provision of the Lease required VoestAlpine "to procure a...property damage liability insurance policy

covering...Mountain States' building...." (Pg. 19) The obligation for real
property insurance lay with Mountain States. (R. 314, ^[6.2(a)) VoestAlpine's obligation for property insurance was limited to its own "personal
or other property to be located on or about the premises...." {Id. at ^f6.2(b))
It is clear that Voest-Alpine is speaking only of its obligation to provide
liability insurance. {Id. at f 6.1)
To answer Voest-Alpine's question about that insurance, it made
perfect sense to require liability insurance at the start of the Lease term even
if possession were delivered later. At the time the Lease term commenced,
Voest-Alpine was on the property working on its lessee improvements. (R.
252/4-12) It may be also that Voest-Alpine was working on its
commitments to Geneva Steel. (R. 252/13-22) It is certain that Voest-Alpine
was assisting Mountain States' with its lessor improvements. (R. 250/5-25)
Voest-Alpine's presence on the leased premises increased the risk of injury
and justified the procurement of liability insurance even though possession
was not formally delivered until later.
Despite what it said about the Lease provisions being "clear," VoestAlpine invites the Court to consider whether the Lease provisions are "vague
and ambiguous." (Pg. 18 n.2) This is based on the deposition testimony of
2

Mountain States' Chris Olsen. (R. 290) Mr. Olsen offered his "opinion" that
the Lease term was extended by Mountain States' failure to complete tenant
improvements. (R. 229/8-12) However, as recognized by counsel for both
parties, Mr. Olsen's testimony was nothing more than a "legal conclusion."
(R. 229/2-4) Mr. Olsen's deposition testimony could not create an ambiguity
that did not otherwise exist in the contract language.
Voest-Alpine claimed (at one time) that the liability insurance provision
did not apply because the accident did not arise out of its "ownership, use,
occupancy or maintenance of the premises." (Pg. 5, f6) Voest-Alpine wisely
dropped this argument since the cited provision is not limited to VoestAlpine's "ownership, use, occupancy or maintenance." (R. 314, 16.1) In fact,
it says nothing about whose ownership, use, occupancy or maintenance is at
issue. It clearly speaks of "any liability arising out of the ownership, use,
occupancy or maintenance of the premises...." There is no question that the
accident arose out of someone's "ownership, use, occupancy, or maintenance
of the premises...." That is enough for the provisions of f6.1 to apply.
At one time, Voest-Alpine also raised the insurance provision in the
"Work Letter," Exhibit "C" to the Lease. (Pg. 6, ^[6) Voest-Alpine wisely
dropped this argument because the cited provision is perfectly consistent with
3

the liability insurance provision of |6.1. In ^|5 of the Work Letter, (R. 298)
Voest-Alpine was required to obtain certain insurance, including
"Comprehensive General Liability Insurance...during the continuance of any
of Lessee's Improvements within the Premises." There is nothing in ^[5
providing that this Comprehensive General Liability Insurance was a
substitute for the liability insurance required by ^|6.1. In fact, it appears that
the liability insurance required by f6.1 would have satisfied Voest-Alpine's
obligation in ^J5 of the Work Letter. Both provisions are therefore perfectly
complimentary.
Mountain States could not disagree more with Voest-Alpine's statement
of contract interpretation. (Pg. 20) Voest-Alpine cites a case about
"postnuptial agreements" where the agreement in question could not be
located, and one of the parties was deceased. Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d 193
f 3 (Utah 2000). There is an important distinction, which Voest-Alpine
failed to mention, between postnuptial agreements and "commercial
contracts." Id. at f20.
In the end, Voest-Alpine's authority is not truly apposite. It merely
restates the rule stated by the Court in Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d
104 (Utah 1991): "A contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of
4

more than one reasonable interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings of
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies." 813 P.2d at 108 (quoting
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983)).
All of which stands for the proposition that courts should not consider
the "fairness" of a written agreement in the absence of an ambiguity. VoestAlpine concedes that the Lease provisions are clear. There is nothing more to
do than sustain the decision of the district court that Voest-Alpine was
obligated, by the clear and unambiguous terms of the Lease, to provide
Mountain States with liability insurance upon the commencement of the Lease
term.
II.

THERE WAS NO WAIVER OF SUBROGATION WITHOUT
NOTICE TO AND ENDORSEMENT FROM THE PARTIES'
INSURERS.
Mountain States' position on the "Waiver of Subrogation" is simple. If

the first sentence of ^[6.4 accomplished a waiver of subrogation, as VoestAlpine contends, (pp. 23-24) there was no need for the second sentence
requiring notice to and endorsement from the parties' insurers. If notice and
endorsement were required for "the insurance policies required [by the
Lease]," it was required for "any" insurance the parties might have if it was
going to form the basis for a waiver of subrogation.
5

Once again, it does not appear that the parties intended a waiver of
subrogation by the first sentence of ^6.4. It is certain that the first sentence
accomplished a waiver of "rights of recovery"' between the parties, which
included their "officers, employees, agents and representatives." However,
the first sentence says nothing about the parties' "insurers."
Voest-Alpine seems to concede that a waiver of subrogation cannot be
effected without the parties' insurers. (Pp. 23-24) Voest-Alpine claims that
"insurers" was implied because of the rules of equitable subrogation. E.g.,
Fashion Place Inv. v. Salt Lake County, 776 P.2d 941, 945 (Utah App.
1989). However, that only speaks to the application of equitable subrogation
to the parties' agreement, not to whether the parties intended the rules of
equitable subrogation as part of their agreement. No one questions that the
parties were free to craft their own agreement, no matter the rules of
equitable subrogation.
Voest-Alpine knows that it must address the second sentence of TJ6.4.
It does so by limiting its application to the "the policies of insurance
required [by the Lease]." (Pp. 25-26) However, even if that were the proper
interpretation, it does not answer the question: Why would the parties
require notice and endorsement for some insurance policies and not others?
6

Voest-Alpine has no explanation. It lamely asserts that "it was possible
that the parties would need to obtain additional insurance to meet the lease
requirements." (Pg. 26) That may be true, but it does not explain why notice
and endorsement were required for the "additional insurance" required by the
Lease and not for other insurance the parties might have irrespective of their
Lease obligations.
There must be some reason for the notice and endorsement requirement
even if that requirement were limited to "the policies of insurance required [by
the Lease]." Strangely enough, Voest-Alpine supplies the very reason:
"Voest-Alpine desired that Mountain States inform its insurers of the waiver
to preclude Mountain States' insurers from bringing an action against VoestAlpine....Mountain States and Voest-Alpine sought to make certain that they
would not be bothered by insurer-driven subrogation actions." (Pp. 29-30)
This is an acknowledgement that waiver cannot be accomplished
without a "knowing relinquishment of a known right." Jenkins v. Percival,
962 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1998). It is also an acknowledgement that the first
sentence of f 6.4 does not accomplish a waiver of subrogation. Otherwise,
there would be no need to inform Mountain States' insurers, in any case, that
they were "precludefd] from bringing an action against Voest-Alpine."
7

Given that, it may be that the parties did not intend to limit the
application of the notice and endorsement requirement to the insurance
required by the Lease. The language of the second sentence says that "upon
obtaining the policies of insurance required hereunder, [the parties shall]
give notice to the insurance carrier or carriers...." There is nothing
indicating that "insurance carrier or carriers" is limited to "the insurance
carrier or carriers providing the policies of insurance required hereunder."
That is certainly one possible interpretation, but not the only one.
Fortunately, there is a way out of this linguistic conundrum. The Court
may interpret f6.4 in a manner that is consistent with all of its stated
language to provide that notice and endorsement were required in the case of
any insurance acquired by the parties, whether or not it was required by the
Lease. This would give effect to the waiver in the first sentence and
harmonize it with the notice and endorsement requirement in the second
sentence.
Otherwise, the Court is left to interpret ^[6.4 so that the waiver of
subrogation applies only to "the policies of insurance required [by the
Lease]." In such a case, the waiver in the first sentence would remain intact,
but it would not apply to the parties' insurers except in the case of "the
8

policies of insurance required [by the Lease]" where there was notice to and
endorsement from those insurers.
Admittedly, this is not the best interpretation, but it is the only other one
that gives effect to and harmonizes the waiver in the first sentence with the
notice and endorsement requirement in the second sentence. LDS Hospital v.
Capitol Life Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988).
One way or the other, TJ6.4 cannot be interpreted in the manner
contended by Voest-Alpine. According to Voest-Alpine, there was an
unconditional waiver of subrogation for insurance not required by the Lease,
but not for insurance required by the Lease. It makes no sense that the parties
would condition waiver of subrogation for the very insurance required by the
Lease, but not for other insurance upon which they might base a waiver of
subrogation.
This would permit suits by the insurers most likely to indemnify the
parties for loss under the Lease, which would defeat the purpose behind the
waiver of subrogation and cannot be what the parties intended.
Since there is no indication that the parties were thinking about "rules"
of equitable subrogation when they made the waiver in the first sentence, it
makes sense that they intended for notice and endorsement to be required in
9

all cases. The only other conclusion is that the parties were thinking about
insurance required by the Lease, since the Lease does not mention insurance
not required by the Lease.1
The legal authority cited by the parties does not help. That is because
the circumstances and waivers were different in every case. For instance,
Touchet Valley Grain v. Opp. & Seibold, 831 P.2d 724 (Wash. 1992), the
parties' agreement expressly provided for waiver of "[s]ubrogation rights."
831 P.2d at 726. The same was true in Continental Ins. Co. v. Boraie, 672
A.2d 274, 275 (NJ. Super. Law Div. 1995). That was not true in this case.
It may be a small point, but Richmond Steel, Inc. v. Legal & General
Assurance Soc, Ltd., 821 F. Supp. 793 (D. P.R. 1993) does not stand for the
proposition that waivers have been enforced "even though the insurers were
not informed of the waiver." (Pg. 31) The court did not address this issue,
and there is no way to know if that was the case. 821 F. Supp. at 799-802.
The same is true for Millican of Wash. v. Wienker Carpet Service, 722
P.2d 861 (Wash. App. 1986). The court ruled that a waiver of subrogation
was enforceable because, according to its own language, it did not
"prejudice the insurance afforded by such policies." That may be because
1

Other than, possibly, the word "any" in the first sentence.
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the insurers swiv notified of the pm\

ISMVM

I lov\ewi , il is impossible to say.

For these reasons, this case should be decided based on the circumstances of
these parties and the language of their agreement.
We can state with assurance that Voest-Alpine is serving up a recipe for
disaster when it seeks to place "the burden on insurers to protect their
subrogation rights by including pioliihihons a^aaist iiiiii lateral subtotal a MII
wahcrs in 'hen

IIIMII.HH.

p»liu H , " (Pg. *2l

Insurers are sure to do just that, but insureds are no more likely to read
those provisions than they are other insurance provisions. This will provide
insurers an opportunity to deny coverage, which will defeat the purpose
behind waivers of subrogation, which is to provide parties to a contract with
insurance to cover their risks. Rit iw a a u / Stt "< >/. siq, >/ < i, 821 F Si lpp at 800. •.•
11"haI is nn»l sound poliev.
It is interesting that Voest-Alpine would say: "If notice and
endorsements were required, either party could unilaterally destroy the waiver
simply by failing to inform its insurers of the provision or by failing to obtain
the endorsement." (Pg. 30)
As we said before, enforcing ihu wan er iii tins i ase
\ ' oest- \lj:)ii lie to a\ oid its obligatioi i lo pro* ale liiahiillil; air1"
11

*

'

'

-e

again defeats the purpose behind waivers of subrogation. Besides, the
solution to Voest-Alpine's problem is quite simple. Parties could demand to
see the insurer endorsements. If Voest-Alpine had done that in this case, it
would have known that the waiver was not enforceable.
Mountain States is in perfect agreement with the citation of Allstate v.
Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197, 1202 (Utah 1980): The purpose of subrogation "is to
work out an equitable adjustment between the parties by securing the
ultimate discharge of a debt by the person who, in equity and in good
conscience ought to pay it."
Mountain States' insurers surely bargained for a premium to pay a
loss, but they would not have paid the loss if Voest-Alpine had satisfied its
indemnity insurance obligation. When Voest-Alpine denied the tender of
defense, Mountain States' insurers had no choice but to pay the loss.
Therefore, according to Voest-Alpine, they should be denied a recovery
since they paid a loss, which they were legally contracted to do, when VoestAlpine failed to provide the insurance for which it was legally contracted.
There is no fairness in that.

2

Since their insurance was not conditioned on the absence of a waiver of subrogation in the Lease.
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III.

IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION BY REFUSING TO AWARD THE
ADDITIONAL AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Voest-Alpine explained to the trial court the "arithmetic error" that

accounted for the omission of $8,173.55 in attorney's fees from the Judgment
for Attorney's Fees. (R. 1139) It submitted a Seconu
Plants
Objections, i

.

t.«

T.
"- ' •

7-11

Voest-Alpine explained that the actual amount of attorney's fees billed
by its Salt Lake City law firm were $38,380.00. (R. 1071, ff) Voest-Alpine
explained that this was supported by all of the bills from Voest-Alpine's Salt
Lake City law firm. (R. 1069) There is every indication that the trial court
considered this mformalmn bofoiv (.iitcimy, .ludj.'iiu'iil
Vocsl Mpnii' ''onli ml1 lli.M lhc 1ml i our' abused its discretion by
refusing to award one-hundred percent of the billed amount from its Salt Lake
City law firm. (Pg. 36) However, Voest-Alpine's legal authority stands
contrary: "A court need not award the entire amount requested, but must
evaluate the requested fees to determine if a lesser amount is reasonable under
the circumstances." Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 220 (Utah App. 1990).

13

There is no indication that the trial court rejected the higher amount
simply because some part of it was left out of the original calculation.
Instead, there is every indication that the trial court agreed with VoestAlpine that $30,206.45 was a reasonable attorney's fee no matter how much
Voest-Alpine was billed by its Salt Lake City law firm.
Admittedly, this does not appear in the record. All we have is the trial
court's handwritten interlineation of the Judgment prepared by VoestAlpine. (R. 1133) If a remand is warranted, it should be for the trial court to
state its reasons for refusing the higher amount.
There is no basis to enter judgment for the entire amount requested by
Voest-Alpine. Mountain States objected to the higher amount (R. 1135)
because Voest-Alpine made it extremely difficult to evaluate the
reasonableness of the extra amount after the initial representation that
$30,206.45 was reasonable.
This Court would have to review all of Voest-Alpine's attorney bills
to confirm that $38,300.00, not $30,206.45, is the proper amount. The better
course, if the trial court's Judgment for Voest-Alpine (R. 955) is not
reversed, is to remand to the trial court for further determination.

14

CONCLUSION
Voest/ \ 1] )ii le I: w is conceded that the Lease was "clear" on the beginning of
the Lease term and its obligation to provide liability insurance. That should end
the inquiry. However, it was not "unfair" to require Voest-Alpine to provide
liability insurance at the beginning of the Lease term when its employees were on
the premises working on tenant improvements
consideration when \hv npxTinvnl is dear.
It *

ii clear that the first sentence of f 6.4 provided for a waiver of

subrogation. It says nothing about "subrogation" or "insurers." All it says is that
Mountain States waived claims against Voest-Alpine, its "officers, employees,
agents and representatives."
If there were no second sentence, tf le Con n I: c 01 ilci pi obabl> coi iclude tl lat
Mountain ^ ile^"' in^mvi'; \\av htnvd Irom h'iiigiiifi I'him k.v;nise ol 1 hr );m of
equitable subrogation. However, it is clear from the second sentence that notice to
and endorsement from the parties' insurers was necessary to effect a waiver of
subrogation, even if only for the insurance required by the Lease, whatever the law
of equitable subrogation.
There is no basis on wl i n; 11 ui I{IMIII<.'UISII I In; IMMIIIUICC lequneil In iln; 1 ease
.mini Iht" inviiiihtnu1 upon w hirh Voest Alpine hiises Us ninini ol \vni\iM ol
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subrogation. It makes no sense that the parties would condition the waiver
of subrogation in the very case where loss would be indemnified under the
Lease. That being the case, the Court must look for a way to harmonize the
notice and endorsement requirement with the waiver.
The only way to do that is construe f6.4 to require notice to and
endorsement from "any" parties' insurer, which, as Voest-Alpine concedes,
is the only sure way to secure a waiver of subrogation. Otherwise, the Court
must construe ^|6.4 as applying only to the insurance required by the Lease
in order to harmonize all of the provisions of 1f6.4 and to secure the benefits
of waivers of subrogation in this and other cases.
Finally, at the very most, the Court should remand the matter of
attorney's fees to the trial court for further determination. There is no basis
on which to enter judgment for the higher amount requested by VoestAlpine.
For the foregoing additional reasons, Mountain States respectfully
requests that the Judgment of the trial court (R. 955) be REVERSED.

16

DATF1

s
DALTON & KELLEY

By
Donald L. Dalton
Attorneys for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
THIS WILL CLRilf1 Y that two true and correct copies of the within
andforegoing "Appellant's Reply Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, this
_£S^ayofJuTy,2001,to:
Terry M. Plant
H. Justin Hitt
Plant, Wallace, Christensen & Kanell
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City UT 84111

f

,N

